Response to “The Challenge of Rangzen”
28 Dec 2007 02:18 EST

Mathieu Vernerey’s article begins by considering how Jamyang Norbu’s “first step” of establishing a pro-independence movement has in his view been fulfilled, and looks forward to what might be the next step for the movement. Most of the direction on which he focuses concerns the “political legitimacy” of independence: establishing the presence of pro-independence forces in the exile government and international governments such that it becomes clear that the call for Tibet’s complete independence has not only historical and moral basis, but also viable popular support and that those supporters are willing to engage in “legitimate” democratic processes. In this area, I believe Vernerey has put forth a lot of insight, regarding both practical considerations for working within the constraints of the exile government’s present system of representation, and the difficulties and prospects for leveraging foreign powers to recognize the exile government.

While The Challenge of Rangzen left me with hopeful feelings about the growth and development of the pro-independence movement, a lot of what Mathieu Vernerey said left me feeling unsettled, and I wish for further exploration of the issues. One central premise of the article is that, while the exile government’s plans of negotiated autonomy are imperfect and headed for failure, they are presently the “only solution” in the absence of “another concrete solution” (from the pro-independence movement or otherwise), and that it’s worthwhile for the exile government to continue in its current path.

The first part of this I take exception to is the claim that no one else has concrete paths of action. ‘Gen Sherap’, famous for his article LHASA CALLING: Why We Must Escape from Exile published on Phayul.com, presented one concrete course of action almost a year ago now, based on the principle of returning from exile to Tibet in mass reverse-exodus. This call was subsequently incorporated by independence activists into the slogan for March 10, 2007: “RISE UP. RESIST. RETURN.”

The second element of Vernerey’s argument which unsettles me is his claim that it’s beneficial to have the exile government locked in dead-end negotiations for autonomy because it’s “safe”:

The differentiation of two sides acting for their respective objectives is momentarily preferable, as well as the Middle Way approach as present policy of the Tibetan government to prevent any kind of retaliatory measures from foreign governments. In this framework, a Rangzen parliamentary group would be the best way to bring political alternance — and even convergence — and achieve a change of policy with less risks.

Perhaps he is right in some senses, but something about these words gives me a bad enough feeling that I suspect he’s possibly wrong. I’m particularly disturbed by the allegation of possible retaliation, as if foreign governments have justification to consider Tibetans’ official renewal of the birthright claim to independence as some betrayal of trust. As an American I’d be completely disgusted by any self-proclaimed “Tibet supporter” in my government who made his or her support for Tibet conditional on Tibetans’ bowing-down to China. I suspect a number of such “supporters” exist, and that identifying and weeding them out as quickly as possible would be in the movement’s best interest, as these people have been taking advantage of their false support for Tibet for decades while getting rich off of their own cooperation, investments, and interests in China. Depriving them of their “Tibet supporter” image among constituents until they become sincere supporters could only help the cause.

The other part of this argument that concerns me is Vernerey’s willingness to use the “Middle Way” as a mask for pro-independence forces to hide behind while growing to fruition. This sort of strategy discredits the sincerity of the exile government by supporting China’s argument that autonomy is a stepping-stone for independence. I can’t help but think that the legitimacy of the exile government and the cause at large would be much better served by outright denouncing the “Middle Way” in the search for independence, instead of trying to use it as a political game piece.

One area where I outright disagree with Mathieu Vernerey is his view on the Olympics:

Rangzen activists should not focus too much on Beijing Olympics, as fundamentally Rangzen cause has no link with Chinese affairs. Beijing Olympics are a great opportunity to highlight Tibetan issue and to confront China, but it is not a goal in itself. It should not become a pretext to postpone again what is more important than everything: the unification and the structuring of the Rangzen movement and the advent of its political representation. Long term strategies have more consistence than immediate and just reactive actions.

What I take the most objection to is his characterization of Olympic action as “reactive”. On the other hand, almost all previous international action for Tibet has been reactive, responding to China’s attacks from the defensive side of the field. Expressing outrage over Tulku Tenzin Delek’s sentence or the Nangpa-la shootings, halting the World Bank’s plans to fund China’s genocide in Tibet, working to free the Drapchi nuns — all of these campaigns have been responding to particular crimes by China and its cohorts. While there have been a few opportunities to go on the strong offensive against China in the past, such as our crippling of the PetroChina IPO, Beijing 2008 is the first chance to attack China on their home turf. It’s about crossing midfield, making it personal, and making China suffer their biggest losses on the international playing field since Mao took power. Rangzen does have a link to Chinese affairs because China is the adversary.

Yet Vernerey is completely right that long-term strategies are essential. The fight for Tibet’s independence will not be over in September 2008, and strategic thinking on viable future directions is necessary to the struggle’s eventual success. My objective in writing this response to The Challenge of Rangzen is not to discredit anyone but to participate in the process of considering strategy and to encourage others to do the same.

Moreover, The Challenge of Rangzen offers some concrete ideas for action leading up to Beijing 2008, specifically seeking foreign governments’ recognition of the Tibetan exile government. This idea has also been recently put forth by Jamyang Norbu and others; what Mathieu Vernerey brings to the forefont as the challenge here is getting the exile government to accept such recognition.

Not being Tibetan myself, I feel like issues of the Tibetan government are in a large sense not my business, but nonetheless they’re constantly on my mind. And one strategy that’s crossed my mind quite a bit in this area recently, as a way to strengthen Tibet’s position without requiring a change in position from the exile government, is to appeal to our governments from the stantpoint that, until a binding agreement is made between the Tibetan exile government and China regarding Tibet’s status, Tibet’s full historical independence is valid and needs to be recognized, even if Tibetan leaders would be willing to surrender that in negotiations. That line of reasoning, taken up by any foreign government, would completely shake the foundations of China’s policy on dealing with Tibet, and have them thinking hard about what to do next.